









Targeting of Cyclone Relief within the Village: 
Kinship, Sharing, and Capture 
 
by 
   













UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA 
Department of Economics 
1-1-1 Tennodai 













Targeting of Cyclone Relief within the Village:  













Contact Information:  
Yoshito Takasaki 
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
University of Tsukuba 
1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba 
Ibaraki 305-8571 Japan  
Tel./fax: +81 29 853 6280  





March 17, 2009 
 
                                                 
* I wish to thank my field team – Jonati Torocake, Viliame Manavure, Viliame Lomaloma, Maria Torocake, 
and Anaseini Savuiwasa – for their advice, enthusiasm, and exceptional efforts on behalf of this project. 
Special thanks are owed also to the Fijians of the region who so willingly participated in the survey. 
Xiaowen Mo undertook the laborious task of data entry and cleaning. I wish to thank Takashi Yamano who 
encouraged me to study the topic of this paper. Comments provided by two anonymous referees were very 
useful to improve the paper. This research has been made possible through support provided by Sumitomo 
Foundation, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 








Targeting of Cyclone Relief within the Village:  
Kinship, Sharing, and Capture 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates targeting of cyclone relief within the village in Fiji. We 
focus on two issues, the link of relief allocation with informal risk sharing and elite 
capture, both of which are directly related to kinship. We find the following. First, food 
aid is first targeted toward kin groups according to their aggregate shocks and then shared 
among group members. Right after the cyclone when aid supply is scarce, households 
with housing damaged and greater crop damage are allocated      aid within the group. 
Our conjecture is that they receive greater net private transfers in other forms especially 
in labor sharing. Consistent patterns are found in village, cropping, and housing 
rehabilitations. Second, there is no elite capture of food aid in the kin group and 
traditional kin leaders rather share it for others; contrarily, non-kin-based community 
leaders capture aid when it is allocated across kin groups. Third, distinct from food aid 
demanded by all, tarpaulins demanded only by the needed are strongly targeted on 
individual housing damage at the village level – not kin group – independent of social 
status. Like food aid, victims with greater crop damage are      prioritized. Implications 





1.  Introduction 
Although timely delivery of relief to victims of natural disaster is critical 
(Skoufias 2003), inefficient distribution of disaster relief with lack of information of 
damages and coordination among relief agents is frequently reported (e.g., Banerjee 
2007). However, empirical research on targeting of disaster relief is very scant due to 
paucity of data. As an exceptional study among Honduran victims of Hurricane Mitch, 
Morris and Wodon (2003) find that the receipt of relief is targeted on pre-shock asset, 
asset loss, and incidence of housing damage among households but the amount received 
is not, concluding that “because the bulk of emergency aid consists of food, clothing, and 
medicine, and because the needs for these goods are relatively         between 
households, there is only limited scope for providing more relief to those who suffered 
great.” (p1280, italics added).  
Recent empirical works on targeting of food aid in Africa reveal similar poor 
targeting performance. Jayne et al. (2002) find evidence of targeting of aid receipt on 
income and rainfall shock in Ethiopia – both at the regional level and at the household 
level within the region – and of lack of targeting of the amount received; “(w)ithin local 
areas it does not appear that field-level rainfall shocks affect local allocations to 
households, so that a potential insurance role of food aid is not being used.” (p286) 
Contrarily, using other Ethiopian data, Dercon and Krishnan (2005) show that food aid is 
shared within the village and this sharing complements weak targeting. Using original 
household survey data gathered in Fiji, this paper examines targeting of cyclone relief 
within the village, an issue Morris and Wodon (2003) do not address with their IFPRI 




The paper focuses on two important issues of disaster relief which have been 
unexplored in the literature. The first is its connection with informal risk sharing. While 
most empirical works on risk sharing focus on consumption smoothing using the full-risk 
sharing model (Cochrane 1991; Mace 1991; Townsend 1994), it is not the only concern 
among victims of natural disasters. In our sample, in addition to crop damage 
experienced by most households, about half suffered from damages on their houses and 
common village facilities were also damaged. Theoretically, under imperfect labor and 
housing markets, people seek to smooth utility determined by consumption, leisure, and 
housing quality (a decrease in housing quality due to the cyclone is a preference shock). 
             consists of               and                   (we focus on ex post risk 
sharing as a joint coping mechanism not ex ante risk management). Labor sharing takes 
two forms:                for                        – repair and reconstruction of 
village structures and facilities – and                across households for         
               – repair and rebuilding of household dwellings. Contrarily,      
               – collecting harvestable damaged crops, cleaning fields, and planting – is 
individually done without using shared labor. In all cases, hired labor is very rarely used.  
Private non-labor transfers (cash and inkind) are made to help households cope 
with crop damage, help victims purchase construction materials, and contribute to village 
rehabilitation. Following Dercon and Krishnan (2005), we assume that cyclone relief is 
shared within the village as part of informal risk sharing.
1 In our study area, while almost 
                                                 
1 While to develop a theory connecting public transfer (disaster relief) with informal risk sharing is beyond 
the scope of this paper, the former has two counteracting effects on the latter, a positive effect augmenting 
resources to be shared and a negative crowding-out effect lowering people’s incentive for sharing. 
Crowding-out occurs because in the risk-sharing arrangement with limited enforceability public transfer 
that increases the value of autarky relative to the value of staying in the contract will reduce the degree of 




all households received generous emergency food aid, only primitive tarpaulins – to be 
used as emergency shelter and for temporary housing repair – were provided for a small 
proportion of victims and no support for major repairs or reconstruction was available 
during our survey periods. We reveal that households who suffered more actually receive 
     food aid. Our conjecture is that they receive greater net private transfers in other 
forms: in particular, overall risk sharing is mainly driven by labor sharing because 
whether households experienced housing damage sharply distinguishes their position as a 
net donor or recipient of labor transfer. To prove this conjecture requires us to compare 
all major forms of transfers, but we lack key data on labor transfer. Alternatively, we 
show that communal labor contribution and the outcomes of cropping and housing 
rehabilitations are consistent with relief allocation patterns.  
The second issue we highlight is aid allocation rules and their implementation at 
the village level about which we know so little (Jayne et al. 2002). As the kin-based 
hierarchy of the Fijian society is well known among anthropologists (Turner 1992), we 
shed light on this black box by examining the role of kinship in relief allocation. Our 
inquiry is directly related to recent studies on the structure of risk-sharing network (e.g., 
Fafchamps and Lund 2003; De Weerdt and Dercon 2006). Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), 
for example, attribute their finding of geographical proximity as a major determinant of 
network formation in Philippines to kith and kin relationships. We show that food aid is 
allocated to kin groups in the village and then shared within the group.   
The significant role played by kin groups as a risk-sharing group in relief 
allocation leads to a concern about elite capture. Distinct from standard household 




influenced by individual social status (e.g., kin leaders) and group status (e.g., chiefs’ kin 
groups). Theoretical predictions are ambiguous. On one hand, the political economy 
literature address elite capture as a drawback of decentralization (Grossman and Helpman 
1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Platteau and Abraham 2002; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006). On the other hand, local elites may rather take less relief to maintain 
their reputation. We also consider other groups than kin groups like women’s groups. 
Development agencies increasingly consider village organizations as essential local 
partners to implement their community-based development projects (World Bank 2002; 
Mansuri and Rao 2004). We find that traditional kin leaders share food aid for others and 
non-traditional community leaders capture it.  
To deepen our inquiry about risk sharing and elite capture in relief allocation, we 
consider different shocks, different relief items, and changes over time. We distinguish 
crop and housing damages which affect various forms of risk sharing in distinct manners. 
We compare food aid, a focus of previous studies on targeting, with tarpaulins. While 
food aid as a positive income shock is demanded by all households, tarpaulins are needed 
only by those with housing damaged. In developing countries their reliance on 
emergency aid from outside donors and their limited capability to handle distribution 
often lead to delayed delivery. Our data of relief provisioned over time within a year 
allow us to see the evolution of allocation rules.  
In general, contrary to extensive anthropological studies, economic studies based 
on household survey data are almost nonexistent in the Pacific region. To better 
understand the nature and performance of targeting of disaster relief is of considerable 




dependency on emergency aid and associated deterioration of indigenous mechanisms 
(e.g., Campbell 1984). Our findings in Fiji suggest a considerable scope for better 
targeting of cyclone relief through existing informal institutions in the village.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study area 
and data; cyclone damage, relief, and rehabilitation; and kinship and village governance. 
Section 3 discusses the econometric specification followed by the estimation results in 
Section 4. Section 5 summarizes major findings and offers implications for relief policies.       
2.  Study area, cyclone, and village governance 
                         
On January 14, 2003, Cyclone Ami swept over the northern and eastern parts of 
the Fiji Islands. Differing from other parts of the country, the area is less prone to be hit 
by cyclones and Ami was the only cyclone in the year. The Red Cross, other NGOs, and 
governments delivered relief.
2 After visiting many native Fijian villages for initial field 
assessment early March, we intentionally chose nine costal villages to cover distinct 
environmental and economic conditions.
3 In each village households were stratified by 
the smallest kin group unit (defined below) and the combination of leadership status (also 
defined below) and major asset holdings like shops, and in each stratum households were 
randomly sampled (n = 374).
4 Interviews were conducted between late August and early 
                                                 
2 The total cyclone damage across the country is estimated at F$104 million, of which dwelling damage is 
F$22 million and crop damage is F$40 million (National Disaster Management Office 2003). Fourteen 
people were killed. In our sample villages no casualties and very limited injuries and illnesses caused by 
the cyclone were reported.  
3 Six villages are on Vanua Levu Island and three are on Taveuni Island. These second and third largest 
islands in the country significantly lag behind the first largest island Viti Levu where the state capital, two 
international airports, and most tourism businesses are situated. Our study does not cover Indo-Fijians.            
4 Households with leadership status and/or major assets were oversampled to guarantee their enough 
observations. All analyses presented in the paper were conducted with and without considering the 
stratification and weighting design. All results are very similar to each other while significance levels 




November. Pre-disaster information and damage measures were thus retrospectively 
collected (the next section discusses potential measurement errors in our data).
5  
Among our sample households, cropping counted for over half total income 
before the cyclone, followed by fishing with a 30% income share (Table 1).
6 About 10% 
households earned significant income from permanent wage labor – especially in the 
public and tourism sectors – in a stable manner independent of the cyclone. Contrarily, 
casual wage labor was very uncommon with negligible contribution to total income.  
                                                    
According to respondents’ subjective assessment, the cyclone damaged more than 
half of residents’ main houses (26 houses or 15% damaged houses were completely 
destroyed and the rest were partially damaged). Figure 1 depicts the proportion of 
households with main housing damaged who were refugees in each month. In January 
almost 40% victims were refugees. Households intensively shared male labor for 
emergency repair (hired labor was very rare). As more and more houses were repaired, 
refugees diminished (less than 5% at the time of interviews). Almost all refugees stayed 
temporarily in others’ residence in the same village and about two thirds lived with those 
in the same clan (defined below). Permanent migration was nonexistent.  
                                                                                                                                                 
allocation within the clan (defined below), several clans consisting of only one household in our sample are 
dropped. Our analysis is based on 333 households with complete data. 
5 In any post-disaster survey conducted several months after the disaster, to gather comprehensive data on 
labor-time transfer, time allocation, and consumption             the disaster is a daunting task.  
6 Almost all households employ traditional farming practices using no mechanized equipment or animal 
traction and limited purchased inputs. Main food crops are taro and cassava. Main cash crops are coconut 
(sold to government-run mills for oil production in addition to own consumption) and kava plant locally 
known as        (a pepper plant used to make a local beverage kava which is a dominant symbol in Fijian 
culture, Turner 1986). Most households conduct subsistence fishing using lines and hooks, simple spear 
guns, or rudimentary nets, and more commercially-oriented fishermen use boats and engine along with 
more valuable nets. Questions about cropping and fishing in the past one month were asked at the interview, 




About half households in our sample also experienced damages on other 
independent dwelling units than the main house like kitchen, shower, and toilet (15% 
households own none of them as they are inside the main house). Housing rehabilitation 
involved repairing or rebuilding a main house and/or other unit(s), and our data contain 
the status of rehabilitation only at the time of interviews. About two thirds households 
completed rehabilitation (16 victims built a new house).
7 In the remaining analyses, we 
focus on the damage on main housing not other units as the former shock was much 
severer than the latter relevant only to owners. We call households with main housing 
damaged and undamaged         and            , respectively.       
Public supports for housing rehabilitation were limited to the provision of 
tarpaulins. Figure 1 shows the cumulative proportion of households who received 
tarpaulins in each month in seven villages excluding the other two which received almost 
none. Delivery started in February and peaked in March – as we witnessed in the field – 
      most refugees got back to their own residence, followed by minor deliveries until 
June. Only 16% households got tarpaulins and victims were more likely to receive it than 
non-victims. All recipients but few received one uniform tarpaulin. Our analysis thus 
focuses on tarpaulin receipt not amount by June. The government provisioned 
construction materials more than one year after the cyclone. Thus, housing rehabilitation 
was determined by labor support and construction materials people could secure.  
                                                        
                                                 
7 Almost all main houses built before the cyclone have metal roof and about two thirds wood wall and floor 
as primary construction materials. While houses with thatched wall or ground floor covered by mat (no 
floor construction) were more likely to be damaged by the cyclone than others, no other significant 
difference exists between damaged and undamaged houses in other construction materials. Among newly 
built houses after the cyclone only about half and one third have wood wall and floor, respectively, and less 
preferred materials, metal and thatched walls and ground floor covered by mat, are commonly used. Thus, 




All nine villages experienced damages on their structures and facilities but we 
lack complete information of such village-level damages and corresponding relief. 
Communal labor – mostly male – played a main role in village rehabilitation. We asked 
communal labor each household contributed                                      (it 
includes one prior to the cyclone and for other purposes than rehabilitation). An average 
household offered 19 days communal labor per adult equivalent.
8 At the time of 
interviews most facilities were not fully recovered due to lack of construction materials.  
                                               
87% households experienced crop damage. The mean value of damaged crops 
was 35 Fiji dollar per adult equivalent (F$1 = US$.60), or equivalently 57% mean 
monthly pre-cyclone crop income (crop damage was calculated based on the quantity 
damaged for each major crop reported by respondents). Crop rehabilitation was 
individually done without using shared or hired labor. People planted ‘catch’ crops 
(which grow fast) after their seeds were provisioned as part of relief and their harvest 
already started before our interviews. Recovery was still incomplete: the mean post-
cyclone crop income was lower than the pre-cyclone level by more than 40%.       
Emergency food aid was the largest relief in the region (the total cost of food 
ration was 20 times that of tarpaulins in the country, National Disaster Management 
Office 2003). Other relief items like water, clothing, and medicine were almost 
nonexistent in our sample. The proportion of households who received food aid in each 
month is depicted in Figure 1. Like tarpaulins the delivery was delayed: by March over 
three fourths households received aid and by April almost all got some. Accordingly, our 
                                                 
8 They are almost equally divided into village and community groups (defined below) and only 3% was for 
kin groups (also defined below). As most facilities are owned and/or used by village or community groups, 




analysis examines aid receipt by March. This first wave of delivery continued until May, 
and after two months interval the second wave arrived in August and September.
9  
Because the monetary value of food aid received was difficult for respondents to 
answer, we asked the quantity measured in days it would have taken to consume in 
normal periods (not actual duration). As foodstuffs in relief were mostly uniform across 
villages, quality difference is not an issue. Mean amounts of food aid                     
          , especially in the months when receipt was common, are mostly in the range 
of 30-40 days (Figure 1). Our monthly data generate two quarterly data in January-March 
and April-June and one half year data in January-June.           households received 
about 12 days food per month on average                 and the mean amount of food 
aid received in the six months period among     households (including non-recipients in 
either quarter) was 9.5 days per month (these two measures are used as a dependent 
variable in our regression analysis). Our sample households could thus rely on aid to 
cover about 30% food consumption. This is a huge injection: based on the government 
estimate of the cost of food ration (F$1.73 per person per day, National Disaster 
Management Office 2003), the value of 57 days ration for six months is equivalent to 
F$99 per capita, almost three times average crop damage per adult equivalent.
10  
                                                         
The correlations of relief with cyclone damages give us initial evidence of 
allocation rules (Table 2). Food aid receipt is negatively and positively associated with 
                                                 
9 Four Vanua Levu villages interviewed from late August through mid-September, earlier than the other 
five, received almost no food aid in July or later, but they might receive some during the second wave of 
delivery after we conducted interviews. With the incomplete data in these four, our analysis focuses on the 
first wave and all descriptive data about food aid after June presented in the paper, including ones in Figure 
1, are based on the remaining five villages with complete data of the second wave. 
10 In the five villages with the complete data of the second wave of food aid delivery (note 9), households 
received about 11 days of food per month over the nine months period from January to September: that is, 




housing damage in the first and second quarters, respectively (the same pattern also 
appears in Table 1). Our interpretation is that households who received labor support and 
contributed less to communal work were less likely to receive aid when its supply was 
scarce and after the supply augmented this allocation rule was reversed. Food aid receipt 
is always negatively associated with the incidence not magnitude of crop damage. Our 
interpretation is that households with crop damage who contributed less to labor sharing 
for the sake of own crop rehabilitation were less likely to be a recipient. On the other 
hand, tarpaulin receipt is positively correlated with house damage (and crop damage 
value), indicating strong targeting. The amounts of food aid received among recipients 
exhibit no significant correlations. Whether these results and interpretations hold in 
systematic regression analyses is a question to be examined in the next section.   
                                    
Three leaders play an important role in the village governance in Fiji. The first is 
            . Every native Fijian belongs to a clan (        ).
11 There are 36 clans in our 
nine sample villages (2-8 clans per village with no overlap across villages). Land is 
communally owned by clan, is privately used, and is not allowed to be sold by law 
(communal land consists of about 83% total land in the country). Some individuals 
holding a traditionally-assigned permanent leadership position in their clan play a major 
role in decisions made by the clan and negotiations among clans. Some clan leaders are 
chiefs with special social status who assume various traditional duties. 
                                                 
11 The hierarchical Fijian kin structure is well known among anthropologists: the bottom is         , 
followed by         ,       , and      , and all native Fijians belong to one tokatoka which belongs to 
one mataqali, and so forth (Ravuvu 1983). Vanua ranges over several villages, there is only one yavusa in 
seven out of the nine sample villages, and mataqali and tokatoka are sub-groups within the village. This 
paper focuses on mataqali which we call     . We repeated our regression analyses using tokatoka as an 




The second is                . In our sample, village chiefs are shared by clan 
leaders (village chiefs are not necessarily clan chiefs). The second important village 
leader next to village chiefs is              (              ) who handle most matters in 
connection with the local government. Gate keepers receive information and materials 
from the government and NGOs, distribute them to villagers, and coordinate village 
meetings. Nine gate keepers in our sample received relief items delivered to the village 
and distributed them to villagers (their comprehensive records are unavailable). While 
gate keepers are a deliverer of relief, how its allocation decision is made is unknown.  
The third is                         (community groups are other groups than 
kin groups in the village). Some groups like church, women’s, and school groups 
received relief through their own network (which cannot be distinguished from relief 
provisioned to the village in our data). Community leadership is neither permanent nor 
directly related to kinship. With a limited number of observations of gate keepers and 
community-group leaders, we combine these two as                 . Clan and non-clan 
leaders, respectively, belong to 8% and 5% of our sample households (Table 1).   
We also consider potential capture by three elite groups: clans with a clan or 
village chief (henceforth,              ), clans with a gate keeper, and clans with 
community-group leaders. Clan and village chiefs come only from specific clans (we 
exclude other clan leaders than chiefs because they exist in most clans) and gate keepers 
are also frequently appointed from certain clans; on the other hand, community-group 
leaderships are unrelated to clans. In this way, we differentiate kin-based traditional elites 
and other non-traditional elites at both the individual and clan levels. In our sample, 42-




3.  Econometric specification  
                                           
Extant empirical analyses on targeting focus on cross-section analysis using 
““reduced form” specifications in which as little structure is put on the decision rules as 
possible, because so little is known about these decision rules and their implementation at 
the village level.” (Jayne et al. 2002, p248) To examine relief allocation at the village 
level, we employ a reduced-form model,  
                                  1 1 1         ,          (1)   
where    is the relief allocated to household  ,   ,    , and   , respectively, are vectors of 
household-level               ,              ,                           which can 
determine relief allocation,   is village dummies which fully control for village-level 
factors including village facility damages and total relief delivered to the village, and    is 
an error term. If relief allocation is independent of informal risk sharing, targeting 
performance is measured by a positive element of   . If relief allocation is part of 
informal risk sharing among villagers, however, the element of    is unsigned because the 
opposite allocation rule is possible when households who suffered more receive greater 
net private transfers in other forms. The capturing and sharing by leaders, respectively, 
are measured by positive and negative elements of   .   
To examine roles of clans in relief allocation, we extend Model 1 to   
                                                    2 2 2 1 1 1               ,    (2)   
where   ,   , and   , respectively, are vectors of clan-level cyclone shocks, social status, 
and other pre-cyclone factors for clan  . If relief is allocated across households only at 




allocation is part of risk sharing, this means that clans do not serve as a risk-sharing 
group or relief allocation is part of risk sharing only at the village level. Contrarily, the 
significant impacts of both clan- and household-level shocks suggest that not only the 
village but also clans serve as a risk-sharing group and relief allocation is part of risk 
sharing at both the village and clan levels. The element of    is unsigned because clans 
which experienced greater damage may receive larger net private transfers in other forms. 
Across-clans allocation rules can be distinct from within-clan allocation.
12  
We conjecture that overall risk sharing is mainly driven by labor sharing because 
housing damage sharply distinguishes households’ position as a net donor or recipient of 
labor transfer for housing rehabilitation. In particular, we hypothesize that: (1) 
households with housing damaged (victims) are a net recipient of labor transfer and 
contribute less to communal work (            ) and (2) households with greater crop 
damage intensify own crop rehabilitation and thus contribute less to labor sharing 
(            ). Then, households who suffered great can be allocated less relief in 
exchange for favorable labor-sharing arrangements and relief allocation rules can be 
distinct between victims and non-victims. We run separate regressions for these two sub-
samples. Pre-cyclone income, asset holdings, and other household characteristics are not 
significantly different between victims and non-victims (Table 1), suggesting that 
housing damage is considered exogenous and selection bias is not a major concern.
13 
                                                 
12 We also estimated models with clan dummies which fully control for clan-level factors (village dummies 
are excluded). This alternative specification focuses on within-clan allocation. The estimation results of 
household-level factors did not significantly change. Thus, unobserved clan-level factors in Model 2 are 
unlikely to cause significant bias in our estimates. 
13 Households with an older head and belonging to leaders’ clans are more likely to experience housing 
damage. Our data show that these households rely more on inferior construction materials discussed in note 
7 (because leaders’ clans are large clans, this relationship also holds regarding clan size). That is, inequality 
in construction materials is higher in leaders’ clans than the others. Inequality in general in the kin-based 




To analyze aid receipt and amount received separately is important because their 
determinants are shown to be distinct in extant studies. To examine how allocation rules 
change over time, we first analyze food aid receipt by March and amount received in 
January-March among recipients using Probit and OLS, respectively, and then amount 
received in January-June using OLS. The former hurdle model is commonly used in 
previous studies (Jayne et al. 2002; Dercon and Krishnan 2005).
14 For comparison, we 
analyze tarpaulin receipt by June using Probit. 
                
In Model 1, household-level cyclone shocks    are captured by a dummy for main 
housing damaged, the value of crop damage per adult equivalent (log), and their 
interaction term (which captures their interactions in risk sharing).
15 In the sub-sample 
analysis for victims and non-victims, only the value of crop damage is used (   is a scalar 
not a vector). Social status    is captured by two dummies for clan and non-clan leaders. 
Other pre-cyclone factors    include standard variables used in extant works such as 
income, asset holdings, and demographic factors as detailed in Appendix (descriptive 
statistics of all covariates are shown in Table 1). Pre-cyclone factors are measured a year 
before our interviews. Our income measure thus rules out the possibility that income is 
affected by transfers due to disincentive effects (Clay and Stokke 2000; Barrett 2002).  
Contrary to housing damage, crop damage is not random but related with land 
holdings and pre-cyclone cropping practices. Even though covariates are added to control 
                                                 
14 An alternative sample selection model is infeasible with our data which lack identifying instruments 
required to credibly estimate the selection equation. 
15 We do not distinguish houses partially damaged and completely destroyed because the latter are much 
less common than the former. We repeated our analyses excluding households with housing completely 
destroyed. The results are almost the same as those presented here. To control for potentially distinct 
patterns among refugees, we also repeated our analyses excluding them. This mostly further reduced the 




for these factors and ex ante risk management is unlikely to play a major role in our less-
cyclone-prone area, crop damage may be still correlated with unobservable factors 
affecting relief allocation. Similarly, pre-cyclone income may be also endogenous. To 
control for the potential endogeneity of crop damage and income requires valid 
instruments for them which our data lack. We ran regressions excluding them to check 
the robustness of estimates of other variables, finding no significantly different results.  
In Model 2, clan-level cyclone shocks    are captured by the proportion of 
housing damaged in the clan and the clan mean of crop damage per adult equivalent (log). 
In the sub-sample analysis, two clan means of crop damage                    , one 
among victims and another among non-victims, are used to allow their potentially distinct 
effects. In the victim sample, for example, crop damages experienced by other victims 
and non-victims in the same clan may affect relief allocation in different manners as they 
play distinct roles in labor sharing. Social status    includes three dummies for chiefs’ 
clan, gate keepers’ clan, and community-group leaders’ clan. Other pre-cyclone factors 
   are detailed in Appendix. Our clan-mean estimates should be reasonably accurate 
because on average we sampled about 70% households in each stratum.  
                                        
We test hypotheses 1 and 2 by examining how cyclone shocks affect village, crop, 
and housing rehabilitations. Since our goal is not to identify impacts of relief allocated to 
households (which is endogenously determined), we employ the same reduced-form 
specifications as relief allocation.
16 First, we directly test both hypotheses regarding 
communal labor using OLS. Next, we test the first half of hypothesis 2 regarding the 
                                                 
16 If allocation rules were exogenously set by relief agents and were perfectly implemented in the village, 




intensification of crop rehabilitation. With lack of labor input data, we examine the 
outcome of crop rehabilitation by employing the first-difference estimator using pre- and 
post-cyclone crop incomes as a dependent variable. Only time-variant shock variables 
(plus village-time dummies) appear as covariates (this specification is a direction 
extension of the full-risk sharing model, Fafchamps and Lund 2003). The effect of 
household-level crop damage on post-cyclone crop income is the combination of the 
negative and positive effects of the direct damage and own labor input for rehabilitation 
corresponding to the damage, respectively. Our null hypothesis is that post-cyclone crop 
income is insensitive to own crop damage, that is, households intensify rehabilitation    
              the magnitude of crop damage (this does not necessarily mean that 
cropping was fully recovered).
17 Then, households with greater crop damage do not 
necessarily earn less cash at the time of interviews but contribute less to labor sharing 
(the second half of hypothesis 2). While we directly test the latter regarding communal 
labor, lack of data precludes us from doing so for labor transfer. Alternatively, we 
examine the outcome of housing rehabilitation – completed or not – among victims using 
Probit. Households with greater crop damage should be less likely to complete housing 
rehabilitation as they receive smaller labor and non-labor transfers including relief.  
                        
Special attention needs to be given to measurement errors in our retrospective 
data. First of all, errors in our measure of housing damage reported by individual 
                                                 
17 We think that households can give a high priority to crop rehabilitation because of the following reasons. 
First, distinct from housing and village rehabilitations relying heavily on labor sharing, crop rehabilitation 
is individually done and its benefits are fully captured by cultivators. Second, distinct from housing and 
village rehabilitations involving costly construction materials, crop rehabilitation can be done only by 
adjusting own labor supply. Third, with very limited public support for housing and village rehabilitations, 
extra cash was greatly needed for purchasing construction materials. Fourth, before the supply of food aid 




households are minimal because relief officers also used three categories – no damage, 
partial damage, and complete destruction – for their damage assessment and thus the 
damage status of each house was common knowledge among villagers. Errors in crop 
damage value may cause bias. We repeated our analyses using a dummy for crop damage 
the measurement errors in which should be minimal, finding qualitatively similar results. 
Hence, systematic errors in crop damage value are unlikely to be a major concern.  
Even if retrospective errors in aid receipt are small, errors in the timing of receipt 
and amount received can be considerable. A key question is whether these errors are 
correlated with the covariates. In particular, households with more damage might tend to 
feel that the delivery was too late and the amount was too small, causing          bias 
in our estimates of shock variables. Measurement errors in the timing of tarpaulin and 
food aid in the six months period are not an issue because it covers all tarpaulins 
delivered and errors across two waves of food aid delivery are unlikely. Our main 
concern is errors in the timing between March and April which are mainly caused by 
households who received aid in either March or April not those who received in both or 
neither of them. With systematic recall bias, the correlation between aid receipt    March 
and shocks in this sub-sample should be smaller than that of receipt    March in the 
whole sample. This pattern holds for housing damage but not for crop damage dummy or 
value (Table 2). Thus, recall bias in timing can be a concern for housing damage in the 
whole sample analysis (it is irrelevant in the sub-sample analysis for victims and non-
victims). We cannot tell how serious other recall bias than that caused by the error in 
timing is in the amount of food aid received. It is important that whenever we interpret 




4.  Estimation results  
We first discuss food aid and rehabilitations regarding cyclone shocks and social 
status and then compare food aid with tarpaulins. Unless otherwise noted, estimation 
results for Model 1 in the whole sample and Model 2 in the whole, non-victim, and 
victim samples are shown in Tables 3 and 4 which report cyclone shocks and social status 
only;
18 other pre-cyclone factors are reported and discussed in Appendix.  
                    
Results for food aid receipt by March, log amount received per month in January-
March among recipients, and log amount received per month in January-June are 
reported in Table 3. In the first quarter, households with housing damaged are less likely 
to be a recipient (Columns 1-4) and those with greater crop damage receive a smaller 
amount (Columns 5-8). The housing damage dummy is jointly significant at least at a 
10% significance level, the latter result on amount holds in both sub-samples, and crop 
damage also negatively affects receipt among victims. These findings are consistent with 
our conjecture that relief allocation is driven by labor sharing. In the first quarter with 
scarce aid supply, labor transfer for emergency repair was of critical importance. Once 
the supply augmented in the second quarter, the allocation rules were reversed so that the 
allocation for the six months period became neutral to shocks (Columns 9-12).
19  
Results for log communal labor per adult equivalent, log crop income per adult 
equivalent per month, and housing rehabilitation among victims are reported in Table 4. 
                                                 
18 Robust standard errors are reported for OLS in Model 1. Standard errors are clustered by clan in Model 2.  
Two exceptions are tarpaulin receipt in seven recipient villages and food aid received in January-March 
among recipients in the victim-sample, both of which contain a small number of clans.    
19 This is confirmed by estimating the determinants of aid receipt in April-June using the same reduced 
form specifications either with or without the amount of aid received in January-March as an additional 




Consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, households with housing damaged and greater crop 
damage contribute less communal labor (except for crop damage among victims probably 
because victims receiving labor transfer from non-victims cannot lower contribution 
much) (Columns 1-4). The combined results of crop and housing rehabilitations support 
hypothesis 2: household post-cyclone crop income is insensitive to own crop damage 
(Columns 5-8),
20 and victims with greater crop damage are less likely to complete 
housing rehabilitation (Columns 9 and 10).  
Table 3 shows that clan-level cyclone shocks affect food aid allocation as follows. 
In the whole sample, clans of which members experienced greater crop damage receive a 
larger amount in the first quarter (Column 6). In the victim sample, clans in which 
victims experienced greater crop damage are more likely to be a recipient in the first 
quarter (Column 4); contrarily, in the non-victim sample, such clans receive a smaller 
amount in the six months period (Column 11). Results for crop damage experienced by 
non-victims in the clan and housing damage among clan members are weak. These 
findings indicate that food aid is first targeted toward clans according to their crop 
damage especially among victims – as victims are prioritized, non-victims are allocated 
less – and then it is shared within the clan in connection with labor sharing. Labor sharing 
is thus important among clan members as implied from the co-residence for refugees.
21  
Supportive evidence is found in rehabilitations as follows (Table 4). First, 
communal labor for village rehabilitation is shared both within the clan and across clans: 
                                                 
20 Predictions regarding own housing damage are ambiguous: households may intensify cropping to earn 
extra cash for housing rehabilitation or may downsize cropping to shift labor to housing rehabilitation. Our 
results show that the former outweighs the latter (the results are statistically insignificant). 
21 This is also supported by our finding that victims in a richer clan are      likely to complete housing 
rehabilitation (see Appendix). If non-labor sharing were relatively important compared to labor sharing in 




non-victims in a clan in which victims experienced greater crop damage contribute more 
to help those victims; contrarily, in the non-victim sample, clans in which non-victims 
experienced more crop damage are allowed to contribute less (Column 3). Second, 
victims in a clan in which housing damage was more common less rehabilitate cropping 
as they are busy in helping each other (Column 8).
22 Third, households in a clan in which 
victims – not non-victims – experienced greater crop damage are more likely to complete 
housing rehabilitation (Column 10). This is possible if each victim receives more support 
from non-victims, i.e., within-clan labor sharing augments.  
                   
Social status strongly influences food aid allocation (Table 3). First, clan leaders 
are less likely to receive aid in the first quarter (the result among victims is insignificant) 
(Columns 1-4); all other estimated coefficients for household-level social status are 
insignificant (weak results of non-clan leaders may be because they combine gate keepers 
and community-group leaders). Second, among victims, chiefs’ and gate keepers’ clans 
are less likely to receive aid in the first quarter and receive a smaller amount in the six 
months period; the converse holds true for community-group leaders’ clans (Columns 4 
and 12). In the whole sample, qualitatively the same results hold for gate keepers’ and 
community-group leaders’ clans in receipt in the first quarter (Column 2).  
These findings suggest the following. First, while food aid received by a village is 
shared by traditional kin leaders, aid received by a community group is captured by its 
leader’s clan not the leader him/herself. In the closely-knit kin society, capturing relief 
allocated as part of risk sharing within the clan can greatly deteriorate capturer’s 
                                                 
22 Predictions regarding clan-level shocks are ambiguous: households may intensify cropping against 
damages among clan members to augment non-labor sharing or reduce cropping to shift labor to labor 




reputation among clan members. As this social cost is too high for all elites, there is no 
capture in the clan. Traditional leaders rather share aid for others to maintain or even 
augment their reputation in the clan and village. Contrarily, since the status of non-
traditional leaders is not directly related to their clan, their social cost of capturing aid 
allocated among clans is not so high. Non-traditional leaders make use of traditional kin 
structure for capturing.
23 This finding supports the argument of Platteau and Abraham 
(2002) that the highly ranked can exercise their authority in other sectors of the village’s 
life. Second, clan status affects aid allocation particularly in the first quarter and among 
victims, that is, when aid was scarce and greatly demanded (recall that less aid was 
allocated to victims then). Third, social status largely alters aid receipt not amount 
received. Put together, the scarcity of food aid augments distinct motives for sharing and 
capturing among different elites in their decisions about who are recipients.  
                                           
Results for tarpaulin receipt by June are reported in Columns (13) and (14) of 
Table 3 (only the results in the whole sample in seven tarpaulin recipient villages are 
shown). Households with main housing damaged are more likely to be a recipient. None 
of clan-level shocks are significant (the statistical significance of own housing damage 
and the overall fitness of the model in Model 2 become weaker) and neither social status 
nor other pre-cyclone factors matter (see Appendix for the latter). These sharp results 
indicate strong targeting on individual housing damage in the allocation at the village 
level not clan. This targeting is weakened by individual crop damage: the marginal effect 
                                                 
23 Victims belonging to community-group leaders’ clans are more likely to complete housing rehabilitation 
(Columns 10 of Table 4). This may be partly because of their capture of food aid. The role of social status 
in communal labor is straightforward (Columns 1-4): households in chiefs’ clans which assume greater 
traditional roles contribute more (our communal labor data is inclusive) and clan leaders contribute less 




of housing damage diminishes as crop damage augments (the highest marginal effect 
with no crop damage is about 30% when all other variables take mean values).  
We think that the sharp contrast in allocation rules according to cyclone shocks 
and social status between food aid and tarpaulins is caused by their distinct characteristics 
and the difference of crop and dwelling damages. On one hand, crop damage is not so 
observable to other households and food aid is demanded by all. There are thus 
significant room and demand for capture. Crop damage is relatively observable among 
clan members who jointly own communal land and labor sharing for housing 
rehabilitation is probably mainly done among them. As such, food aid allocation among 
clan members can be tightly linked with their labor sharing.  
On the other hand, dwelling damage is well observable to all villagers and only 
those whose main house and/or independent units were damaged demand tarpaulins. 
There are thus limited room and demand for capture, resulting in the strong targeting on 
victims without involving across-clans allocation. As tarpaulin supply is insufficient 
(much scarcer than food aid), an additional allocation rule is employed according to crop 
damage: victims who contribute less to labor sharing among villagers – not clan members 
– are less prioritized (this is consistent with our earlier finding that they are less likely to 
complete housing rehabilitation). As such, how relief allocation is linked with other 
forms of risk sharing varies across relief items.  
5.  Conclusion  
Using original post-disaster survey data gathered in Fiji, this paper investigated 
targeting of cyclone relief within the village. Our focus was on the link of relief 




to kinship. We found the following. First, food aid is first targeted toward kin groups 
according to their aggregate crop damage especially among those who experienced 
housing damage and then shared among group members. Right after the cyclone when 
aid supply is scarce and labor help for housing repair is critical, households who suffered 
more are allocated      aid within the group. Our conjecture was that they receive greater 
net private transfers in other forms: in particular, households with housing damaged and 
greater crop damage, respectively, are less likely to receive aid and receive a smaller 
amount in exchange for favorable labor-sharing arrangements among group members. 
After aid supply augments, this allocation rule is reversed. Although lack of data 
precluded us from proving our conjecture, we found consistent patterns in communal 
labor for village rehabilitation and cropping and housing rehabilitation outcomes.  
Second, there is no elite capture of food aid in the kin group and traditional kin 
leaders rather share it for others probably to maintain their reputation in the group and 
village. Contrarily, non-traditional community leaders capture aid when it is allocated 
across kin groups, i.e., they make use of kin structure for capturing. Both sharing and 
capturing mainly occur when recipients of scarce aid are determined. Third, distinct from 
food aid demanded by all, tarpaulins demanded only by the needed are strongly targeted 
on individual housing damage at the village level – not kin group – independent of social 
status. Victims with greater crop damage are      prioritized presumably because 
tarpaulin allocation is linked with the labor sharing among villagers. 
These findings lead to the following policy implications. First, while targeting of 
disaster relief on shocks is important, the performance of broad risk sharing needs to be 




for relief are heterogeneous across households even in the same village and there exists a 
scope for targeting of both aid receipt and amount received on idiosyncratic shocks 
through private risk sharing. This self-targeting can complement weak targeting of 
disaster relief, but existing private mechanisms needs to be better understood first. In 
particular, the self-targeting may be attained not only by the village itself but also by sub-
groups in the village like kin groups. Second, in the kin-based society where social 
reputation in the kin group and village is a central concern, the risk of elite capture can be 
rather higher in relief provisioned to non-kin-based community groups than that to the 
village because the former’s reputation-based sharing mechanism is weaker than the 
latter. Contrary to community development, village organizations may not be good 
targets or partners in disaster relief management in certain locales. Third, timely delivery 
of sufficient relief is important not only to better satisfy the demand of the needed but 
also to reduce elite capture and thus improve self-targeting. Lastly, effective relief 
policies can be distinct across different shocks and across relief items as how relief and 
informal risk sharing are related with each other depends on each shock and each item. 
Policy makers need to design a good combination of shock-and-item-specific policies.   
Appendix 
This appendix discusses other pre-cyclone factors used as covariates and reports 
their estimation results (except for the first-difference estimates of crop income). Relief 
allocation and rehabilitation results, respectively, are shown in Tables A1 and A2 of 
which the column numbers match with those in Tables 3 and 4.  
Household-level other pre-cyclone factors include income per adult equivalent per 




among adults (capturing human capital), household adult equivalent size (log), 
proportions of children and elderly (capturing labor resources), the age of household head 
(log), and a dummy for female head. Clan-level other pre-cyclone factors consist of the 
clan mean of pre-cyclone income per adult equivalent per month (log) and clan 
population share in the village (based on population not sample) (the mean and standard 
deviation of the latter are .39 and .21, respectively).  
While none of other pre-cyclone factors affect tarpaulin allocation, they 
significantly alter food aid. In the six months period, households (except for non-victims) 
with lower pre-cyclone income and more children receive more aid, indicating targeting 
toward the poor and children. Bigger households (except for victims) receive less aid per 
capita, indicating the allocation rule not fully reflecting household size (the same finding 
is obtained by Jayne et al. 2002). Bigger clans receive more, suggesting an important role 
played by across-clans bargaining in the allocation. In the first quarter, household size 
and the number of children (only in the whole sample) have qualitatively the same 
impacts on amount received as those found in the six months period; pre-cyclone income 
shows no significant effects and clan size only affects receipt in the whole sample. 
Households holding larger fishing capital receive a smaller amount (except for non-
victims), indicating targeting toward the asset poor. The male headed (except for victims) 
and households with secondary education are more likely to receive aid despite that some 
educated adults earned secure income from their permanent jobs after the cyclone. This 
suggests that scarce aid was captured by the educated and males.  
Larger households, the female headed (except for victims), households with more 




labor per adult equivalent. Households with educated adults (only in the whole sample) 
contribute less probably because of their high opportunity cost of labor time and 
permanent jobs held by some of them. Households in a richer clan (except for victims) 
also contribute less. This may be because richer clans contribute larger non-labor transfer 
(for any purposes). Older households, households with educated adults, smaller 
households, and households with more children are more likely to complete housing 
rehabilitation probably because seniority is an advantage in securing support, some 
educated adults hold permanent jobs, household size is positively related with house size, 
and labor sharing is preferably altered by children as found in communal labor. 
Communal labor and housing rehabilitation are neutral to pre-cyclone income and assets.  
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Pre-cyclone income per adult equivalent per month (F$):
Total 113 (116) 117 (112) 110 (119) 0.57
Cropping 60.4 (90.5) 64.8 (91.0) 56.5 (90.1) 0.40
Fishing 33.7 (40.8) 32.1 (37.4) 35.2 (43.7) 0.50
Permanent wage labor 10.6 (41.8) 12.1 (50.8) 9.3 (31.8) 0.54
Casual wage labor 0.4 (3.0) 0.4 (2.6) 0.5 (3.4) 0.64
Other 7.0 (44.5) 6.6 (21.3) 7.3 (57.8) 0.88
Cyclone shocks:
Housing damaged dummy 0.53 (0.50) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00
Independent units damaged dummy 0.52 (0.50) 0.31 (0.46) 0.71 (0.45) 0.00
Crop damaged dummy 0.87 (0.34) 0.87 (0.33) 0.87 (0.34) 0.93
Crop damage per adult equivalent (F$) 34.5 (44.6) 35.1 (49.2) 34.0 (40.2) 0.82
Cyclone relief:
0.16 (0.37) 0.09 (0.28) 0.22 (0.42) 0.01
Food aid receipt dummy
By March 0.77 (0.42) 0.85 (0.36) 0.70 (0.46) 0.00
In April-June 0.79 (0.41) 0.73 (0.44) 0.84 (0.37) 0.02
By June 0.95 (0.21) 0.97 (0.16) 0.93 (0.25) 0.07
Food aid per month (days)
in January-March (recipients only) 12.6 (7.7) 13.2 (8.2) 12.0 (7.2) 0.22
In April-June (recipients only) 11.9 (7.2) 12.0 (7.9) 11.9 (6.7) 0.85
By June (whole sample) 9.5 (6.3) 10.0 (6.2) 9.1 (6.4) 0.22
Rehabilitations:
18.8 (16.0) 19.9 (17.3) 17.9 (14.7) 0.24
35.0 (59.4) 38.8 (54.7) 31.5 (63.3) 0.26
0.68 (0.47) 0.78 (0.42) 0.66 (0.48) 0.15
Social status:
Clan leader dummy 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.29) 0.06 (0.24) 0.26
Non-clan leader dummy 0.05 (0.23) 0.04 (0.21) 0.06 (0.24) 0.47
Chiefs' clan dummy 0.43 (0.50) 0.36 (0.48) 0.49 (0.50) 0.02
Gate keepers' clan dummy 0.42 (0.49) 0.30 (0.46) 0.53 (0.50) 0.00
Community group leaders' clan dummy 0.50 (0.50) 0.42 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.01
Other pre-cyclone factors:
Land holdings (acre) 4.78 (5.65) 4.60 (5.39) 4.93 (5.89) 0.60
Fishing capital (F$) 473 (1497) 587 (1935) 371 (942) 0.19
Adults' secondary education dummy 0.84 (0.36) 0.83 (0.38) 0.86 (0.35) 0.45
Household size (adult equivalent) 4.93 (2.23) 4.79 (2.09) 5.06 (2.35) 0.26
Proportion of children (<15) 0.32 (0.2) 0.31 (0.2) 0.33 (0.2) 0.43
Proportion of elderly (>65) 0.06 (0.14) 0.07 (0.16) 0.04 (0.13) 0.14
Age of household head 48.3 (13.7) 50.1 (13.9) 46.7 (13.4) 0.03
Female head dummy 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30) 0.86








Note - Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. t-test and chi-squared tests compare the means and 
proportions for continuous and dummy variables, respectively. Test results with a 5% significance level are bolded.
Post-cyclone cropping income per adult 
equivalent per month (F$)
Housing rehabiliation completion dummy 
(among households with main house or 
independent units damaged)




Communal labor per adult equivalent in 




























Note - p-values are shown in parentheses and those with a 5% significance level are bolded.  
Food aid receipt in March among households who 
received either in March or April (not both)
Food aid per month in April-June (among 
recipients) (days)
Food aid per month in January-June (in the whole 
sample) (days)
Tarpaulin receipt by June dummy (in seven 
recipient villages)
Food aid receipt by March dummy
Food aid receipt in April-June dummy














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Proportion of refugee households among those with housing damaged
Cumulative proportion of households who received tarpaulins
Proportion of households who received emergency food aid
Mean amount of food aid received among households who received (days)
 